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I.
Sometimes it helps to begin with the critics, if we are to understand what a
document is about. We can learn somethin g of the main preoccupations of
Veritatis Splendor by looking at the position of two of its feminist critics.
While in some respects their criticism is not well made, it serves
nonetheless as a kind of exhibit, di splaying the habits of the heart which
contemporary society assumes in reflecting on such issues. What is
particularly striking is what they overlook, revealing a widespread and
perhaps systematic blindness in face o f certain aspects of traditional ethical
teaching. The authors consider the case of an Italian woman (Gianna
Beretta Molla) who had a cancerous condition, which, if fully operated,
would have ended the life of her unborn child . She chose to have only a
minor operation, putting her life at risk to ensure that her child at least
would live. And this is more or less what happened, the child being carried
to term and the mother dying a few days after the birth . She was beatified
1
by John Paul" in 1994.
The criticism of the authors follows a predictable course. Presumably
the strongest argument they could make is that such cases can be used to
justify unhealthy suffering.2 What they actually say goes much further.
They are against theologies that regard suffering as " a value in itself'; they
insist that voluntary suffering is justified only if it leads to "a greater good
which involves the alleviation of the suffering"; and they reject suffering
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that is "coerced onto a group or individual.'" After giving a short account
of the woman ' s life, the two critics make this comment:
This account shows quite clearly the patriarchal thinking that assigns
undue suffering to women in the name of strict adherence to a moral
precept - a precept which no woman had any voice in articulating
... Their (i.e. women's) suffering is literally spiritualized through
beatification and is held up as a model of Christian faithfulness .4
There are some detailed comments which could be made about these
cntlclsms. For one thing, they seem to misrepresent the traditional
Catholic position on such cases. But the overall thrust of the critique is
clear enough, and encompasses two main points. The first touches
suffering and its place in human life, whether it can ever playa positive
role or have a significance in itself. Because they object to the social
consequences of any positive value of suffering - i.e., that we should see
those who suffered as having benefited from their suffering, at least in
some cases - the authors are unhappy that Gianna Molla should have been
beatified. Raising such a person to sainthood sends the wrong signals to
other women. The second point is political, that one group should not be
telling another what to do, that at very least, a group needs representation
among those who are formulating such principles. Behind this, we sense
the guiding principle of the critique: the principle of autonomy. What is
particularly is what the criticisms overlook. There is not the slightest sense
that Mrs. Mol1a ' s action might have been a great human action for al1 that,
displaying the human at its truest and best - even if it is admitted that it is
not an action which others are obliged or even encouraged to imitate. Yet
surely this is the way most people would judge Mrs. Mol1a ' s action, at least
those whose minds are not contaminated by philosophy, theology, or
politics.
The authors of the article al10w that voluntary suffering is permissible
in some cases. But it must ultimately be aimed at "the al1eviation of the
suffering." There is only one clear category of actions which satisfies this
criterion - that of the worker for justice, who suffers in order that others
s
may not have to suffer. Mrs. Molla ' s action fal1s far short of this, being
focused only on a small part of the world, one with which she has
immediate material connections, the life of the child growing within her. It
lacks any direct political aim. Far from being directed towards al1eviating
suffering, it seems to undergo it simply. Defenders of Mrs. Molla might
suggest that her context of action is in fact larger than the authors of the
article think - that it articulates something of the lasting human condition,
showing forth (with al1 qualifications) what a human life at its best always
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is and should be. But such an idea of the human condition is precisely
what the authors of the article want to move away from. It would "present
victimization as the normal experience of living.,,6 Their ideal human life
looks quite different, being freed from the oppressive heteronomy of the
past, and looking to what they call the promotion of "full humanity.,,7 With
this we come to the second theme, that of autonomy.
The authors' argument against the case of Gianna Molla from the
standpoint of human autonomy is not particularly well made. The authors
suggest that the saint was the victim of oppressive rules devised by others,
that she lacked "choices and options", and may well have had private
thoughts about her suffering which were quite different from those of the
official account. 8 This is deeply unfair to Mrs. Molla, who knew full well
what she was doing, and that she could have done otherwise. She had
qualified in 1949 as a doctor, after all. Her advisors did not put pressure on
her to do what she did - if anything, they tried to dissuade her. Her real
offense is not a lack of autonomy, but that her autonomous action took a
direction of which the critics do not approve. If she had made a medical
breakthrough, or had been the first woman in a particular field, showing
other women that they could follow, it would be different. But to gain any
credit in this frame of reference, she would have to advance the freedom of
herself or of a larger group, opening up choices which were not there
before. Presumably defenders of autonomy could in some cases praise
people who gave their lives for others - revolutionary leaders might be an
example. The problem with Gianna Molla' s action is that it just does not
look like this sort of autonomy, fitting too well into traditional
understandings of the relation of mother to child, ever to be portrayed as an
emancipatory advance. If anything, it reflects a deep sense of obedience.
These themes of suffering and autonomy are closely connected. The
suggestion that it might be good, at least in some circumstances, for human
beings to submit to a larger order, rather than simply to forge the future
they want, is immediately suspect to those whose primary framework is
political and emancipatory. This probably explains the hostility of the
critics to any hint that people should embrace suffering willingly, at least in
some cases, as part of the human vocation. Suffering is rather to be
regarded negatively - the only thing to be said about it is that it should be
alleviated. The suggestion that it might enoble in any way inevitably gives
the wrong impression, leading people into an unhealthy passivity. The
authors condemn the authoritative belief system which could produce a life
. Iike that of Gianna Berreta Molla. This is strangely ironic - a different
point of view might see such a life precisely as a reason to respect the
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system of belief which produced it. Veritatis Splendor can be read as an
attempt to recall us to such a point of view.
II.
Many of the critics of Verita/is Splendor seem to miss the wood for
the trees because they do not realize how much its outlook differs from that
9
of contemporary Western society, and therefore from their own. Often
enough, the current Western moral vocabulary has only one question: is the
vocabulary ours, a product of autonomy and not of heteronomy? But as the
encyclical implies, we are born into a sort of heteronomy, our
consciousness being part of a larger life which we did not ourselves make, 10
and which prescribes virtues we have to develop if we are to live a human
life at all. The " human" is there waiting for us, before we think about it, so
that there is something to which our vocabu laries should correspond even
as they bring it to articulation (an articulation which is itself part of the
" human" ). But as the encyclical also insists, it is wrong to call this
" heteronomy". !! It is rather the foundation of our limited human autonomy,
the only sort we were made for. To consent to the human is to consent to a
life we did not make, of which we are in a sense the stewards. This is the
strong teaching on human nature which the encyclical wants to promote.
The encyclical believes that th ere is a "truth about man as a creature"
(VS n.3 I) and that freedom mu st take account of this. It sums up its main
thesi s near the beginning of the final chapter: " Freedom is rooted in the
truth about man" (VS n.86). A statement that freedom depends on truth
can arouse very different re sponses. On the one hand, the dependence can
seem obvious. I cannot even walk through a door without first ascertaining
where it is, and whether it is open . A freedom which tried to operate
without attending to the prior state of the world would be a bad joke. But
the thesis can also look like a contradiction. "Truth" refers to something
which is there before we even consider it while "freedom " is open and
fluid . So an attempt to submit freedom to truth can seem a denial of what
freedom really is, reducin g it to the functions of a calculus. Telling
someone to come to a free decision on some matter and then telling them
that the outcome will of course be this, is a denial of freedom . The
twentieth century contains a large literature on this, maintaining that we
often deliberately do away with our freedom by submitting to various
" truth s." Freedom is frightening, so we tame it by bringing it under
something else - prohibitions of nature, the Ten Commandments, the
categorical imperative - the paraphernalia of bad faith .!2 And it can look
as if any insistence that freedom depend s on truth must come down to this.
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A common resolution of the problem distinguishes between material
things and human subjects, attributing a predetermined nature only to the
former. Doors are always the sorts of things that if they are open, you can
walk through them. But there is nothing much that human subjects always
are, before they have decided to become something. A definition of the
human as such is precisely a definition of something which has no essence
in the conventional sense, as Sarte famousl y argues. 13 Sarte ' s position has
lately been trumped by the more radical view which thinks that not only are
human beings without a nature, but everything else is without one toO.14
The encyclical wants to argue in the opposite direction to both of these, that
(with some qualifications) human beings have a nature as other things do,
and that this makes them part of the material creation and provides a
natural basis for ethics. Freedom is part of a larger structured life, which it
is intended to serve. "(I)ts absolute and unconditional origin is not in itself,
but in the life within which it is situated ... " (VS n.86)
The difficulty of uniting the concept of freedom with that of nature
should not be underestimated.
It can seem a contradiction to a
consciousness formed in " modern" categories, leading inevitably to an
unhealthy dependence on mere biology. As the encyclical notes, the
Church ' s position on sexual morality is sometimes understood in this way,
leading to accusations of " physicalism" or " naturalism" . "Contraception"
and "artificial insemination" are among the acts whose prohibition
supposedly goes back to this mode of thinking. The encyclical strongly
denies that it means anything like this (VS n.47). The same kind of
reduction can be applied in a slightly different context (that of animal
behavior) to yield different results. We can try to found an ethics on what
most people do most of the time. Surveys of behavior tell us what is
" normal" and this is the nearest we get to a specification of what people
should do (VS n.46). But as the encyclical points out, we cannot deduce a
normative morality from the behavioral sciences (VS n.11 I). In any case,
the things most people do most of the time do not reflect human nature at
its best, as we live in a fallen world . The world reflected in statistical
surveys is not the world as it was originally meant to be (VS n.112).
To a "modem" consciousness, these seem to be the only possibilities
for understanding a freedom which is obedient to nature. Since such
possibilities cannot found an ethics, the major premise tends to be
abandoned in favor ofa nature which is obedient to human freedom (or can
be rendered so). This leads to ethical approaches which try to "overcome"
nature, or which at best use it as a base for the cultural constructions of
freedom (VS n.46). Both of these need to take account of the way nature
is. But any deeper idea of obedience to nature is foreign to them . Their
approach is ultimately calculative, seeing nature as something to be
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handled and managed, rather than part of what the subject itself is, to which
we owe a kind of obedience.
These approaches rai se questions as to the identity of the self who
makes such ethical deci s ions. The encyclical makes the significant
comment during its discll ss ion of these approaches that the " modem"
understanding leaves the human being without a nature at all (VS n.436).
The self can be identified only with freedom. This does not mean it is
entirely without moral orientation - freedom itself may impose certain
demands, as Kant believed. But it lacks any original commitment to a
particular sort of bodily life, a belief that the bodily human being was
originally made to do some things and not others.

III.
The encyclical believes that the goods which the human being was
made to achieve are not just the goods of a rational decision-maker, but of a
bodily creature. There is a way human beings are meant to live, before
they even give thought to the matter - a certain sort of life they are made
for. One way of looking at moral action is to see it as an assent to what
God made us. In order to think this, the encyclical insists on the unity of
the bodily and spiritual sides of human life, refusing "any division between
freedom and nature" (VS n.5 0). It refers to the Catholic Church ' s
endorsement of the Aristotelean teaching of the unity of the human person,
" whose rational soul is per se et essentialiter the fonn of his body" (VS
n.48). The finalities of bodil y functions are not merely " physical" or " premoral". The body offers " reference points for moral decisions." We do not
just take account of material realities, but are in the first place a natural,
material reality. So we discover in the body, " the anticipatory signs, the
expression and the promise of the gift of self, in confonnity with the wise
plan of the Creator" (VS n.48). In other words, the body contains
indications of the moral form which a life is to take. Freedom has larger
obligations, beginning " not in itself, but in the life within which it is
situated" (VS n.86). This means that it is possible for free actions to
contradict the meaning of the life which they should express. The
encyclical refers to " manipulations of corporeity which alter its human
meaning" (VS n.50).
Those who think instinctively in " modem" categories can feel lost as
to what the encyclical is proposing here, how we can speak of bodily
relations as the bearers of moral significance without falling into a
" naturalist" interpretation . This is a very old problem . W.K.C. Guthrie
traces the various types of sophism in fifth century Greece back to the
separation of physis from nomos.' s This distinction, often translated as the
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distinction between nature and culture, is an ancestor of contemporary
distinctions between nature and history, or nature and freedom. Plato
shows that once physis and nomos are separated like this, our rationality
loses any deeper basis it might have had. Either it seems to support mere
phys ical interests, as in Thrasymachus' view that justice is really the
interests of the powerful , or it seems to construct whatever it wants on the
basis of the physical, as in Ca llicles ' view that justice is really a fiction
constructed by the weak to defend themselves against the strong. 16
As it clearly indicates, the encyclical is philosophically Aristotelean
here. Aristotle saw that human reason does not simply promote the
" animal" goods of a wider human life, as if reason had a mere instrumental
relation to them . It also transforms such a life, so that the " passionate"
elements serve the " rational". 17 But such a transformation is not a fiction
created by reason , which does violence to our animal nature. The human
" passionate" elements were meant to be informed by the rational ,18 which
brings the physical life of humans to the perfection it was made for . That
we should discuss political goods with others, and build a common order in
which they can be achieved, is not a complicated way of imposing power,
or disguising our lack of it. Rather such talk is itself one of the goods of
the animal we are. In a certain sense, our talk is not a product of nature - if
it were, we would all talk the same language. But that we should talk is
natural, for all that, one of the peculiarities of our nature being that it
should complete itself through what is not merely " natural".
It might help to take a particular example here, one which the
encyclical mentions in passing, the command to " honor one ' s parents" (VS
n.52). The peculiarity of thi s injunction can escape us, it is such a familiar
part of our ethical inheritance . Why exactly should I incur ethical
obligations towards people simply because of a physical accident - that
they happen to be the ones through whom I came into the world? One can
attempt to reduce freedom to nature here, saying that humans care for their
yo ung simply out of felt in stinct. Or one can move in the opposite
direction, trying to establish the injunction on the basis of a freedom or
rationality which is independent of any contingent material relations. For
example, I could say that I " owe my parents a debt of gratitude" for their
having supported me through my childhood and youth . But this may not be
true - my parents may not have performed their duties particularly well.
Anyway, the basics for a contract are lacking. I never gave my consent to
it. Or we could argue from the direction of the general good, that society is
better off when the younger generation respects the older. This again
submits the injunction to a higher set of principles, which apply
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universally, and reduces obligations to parents to a more general obligation
towards the good of society as a whole.
But the encyclical wants to maintain the injunction as a primary moral
command which follows on my being born to these parents. Sheer biology
has a part to play in the structure of moral obligation . Or it might be better
to say that biology is never simply " sheer" biology, where human beings
are concerned. Bodily existence itself, by establishing us at a particular
point in the material creation, founds our first moral obligations. One of
the effects of this approach is to limit the obligations we incur. Catholic
moral teaching based on natural law is sometimes reproached for lay ing
burdens on human shoulders. But in a sense, it does just the opposite,
limiting the responsibilities of human beings. We are not in the first place
spiritual subjects who face the whole of the material creation, with
responsibilities for all of it (perhaps leaving us with the feeling that we do
not know where to start), but bodily subjects who grow up with obligations
towards some people which we do not have towards others.
The position has an important consequence for contemporary
discussions in Catholic moral theology . While every ethics admits that
calculations of consequences play some part in moral decisions, the
encyclical ' s position implies that such calculations are not the primary
form of moral reflection . The converse of the example described above is a
further useful illustration . Thomas Aquinas sees the duty of parents to look
after their children as part of the natural law, foll owing on the fact that the
19
children owe their existence to their parents.
We could well imagine a
parent making many decision s in fulfillment of this duty which involved
weighing of goods against other goods, and balancing good effects of
decisions against the inevitable negative effects (Which school should my
children attend? Should they learn music ?, etc.). But the parent does not
regard the original duty of being a good parent as subject to such a
calculus. It is not as if the children are to be looked after only if this proves
the best thing for me to do after this has been weighed against other
possible courses of action . If it comes down to a choice between looking
after my children or taking up an important political office (and I cannot do
both), there should be no choice, even if it seems I could do more for my
country than anyone else could. My detailed activity of weighing goods
and evils takes place within a context of bodily relations which is already
given to me, a context which is not itself to be submitted to such a calculus.
This context arises out of my material existence, as one who has parented
these particular children.
This position holds that the ends of a human life are given in advance
and that its free actions should aim to achieve such ends. Above all , it
leads to an ethics suitable for creatures, who also share in God ' s
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providence (VS n. 43). One of the implications of this way of thinking is
that it is also possible to act in ways which disregard the life a human being
was made for, and are therefore inhuman . Certain negative precepts
safeguard the minimum required for the human to be present at all. For
example, the encyclical describes precepts against lying or directly killing
the innocent as " universally binding" and " unchanging" (VS n.52).
Assuming one of these actions is in question, the precept obliges
" regardless of cost" (VS n.51) . [n such cases people should consider the
matter closed, and should not even begin to calculate the consequences.
Might the direct killing of the innocent sometimes be justified - in wartime
for example? The encyclical ' s response : do not ask, do not even begin to
calculate. There is no space between avoiding evil and avoiding certain
actions. A voiding the latter is a constitutive part of the former, for a human
being. As the encyclical puts it (somewhat opaquely), the prohibition of
such actions does not "inhibit" a good intention, but is its "basic
expression" (VS n.82). Once again , this limits the responsibility of
humans. We should not see ourselves as responsible for the physical evils
which may follow a refusal to act in an inhuman way. This position
reflects a trust in Providence, and a sense of a limited human role in the
scheme of things, as befits an ethic of creatures. When tempted by actions
which should never be done, humans should simply act rightly; the
outcome of the refusal to do evil is the affair of God, who made the larger
order in which such a situation could arise, and Who will bring it to its
perfection in His own way .
Such a concept of human nature also provides a standard to assess the
actions of those who go beyond the minimum required for an action to
count as human . There is no " higher limit" to the love of God and neighbor
(VS n.52), so that there is infinite room for actions which show the nature
of the human being writ large. One of the reasons why the case of the
Italian woman already quoted is so striking is that her action surely
expresses something of what being a parent always is, the gift of oneself
over many years, which children are never really able to repay, and which
they can at best pass on to others when they become parents in their tum.
Certain actions sum up what humans always are, even if they show it writ
large, and in a form that others are not obliged directly to imitate. Such
actions are desperately important for us, keeping alive as they do our sense
of what it is to be human . And if they fundamentally challenge
contemporary vocabularies for which autonomy is the highest value, and
" human nature" has no meaning, then so much the worse for the
vocabularies.
To see examples like that of Mrs. Molla as fundamental, providing an
original measure for human vocabularies by indicating what it is they are
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trying to bring to expression, is to grasp the encyclical ' s teaching on human
nature. "(T)here is something in man which transcends ... cultures. This
' something' is precisely human nature : this nature is itself the measure of
culture .. . " (VS n.53). To admit this is to acquire eyes once again for the
beautiful actions which humans tum up from time to time (perhaps
surprising even themselves), discovering and bringing to perfection a self
whose laws they did not construct, and which are always stranger than they
thought. Such examples remind us of what we already knew but had
forgotten in the pressures of everyday - what it is to be one of God ' s
human creatures. This is the truth which precedes our freedom , the one of
which the encyclical wants to remind us.
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